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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE S. PERKINS and
LILLIE PERKINS,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants ,

>

Supreme Court No. 20642

)

District Court No. C82-6009

vs.
INTERLAKE THRIFT, a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

The case before the court had been bifurcated into two
trials denominated as Phase I and Phase II. The issues for
review before this Court are set out accordingly, as the
Appellant has appealed rulings from both trials.

A. PHASE I.
1.

Priority of title as between the owner of real
property, the purchaser, and the purchase money
lender.

2.

The effect of the Recording Act §57-3-2 and
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§57-3-3, U.C.A. (1953, as amended).
3.

Subordination by Seller of property to purchase
money lender,

4.

Constructive notice to Lender of Seller's retained
interest.

5.

Duty of Seller to enforce Sales Agreement.

6.

Application of Merger Doctrine in sale of real
property.

B.

PHASE
1.

Election of remedies by Trial Court in granting
monetary damages rather than rescission.

2.

Duty of Seller to mitigate his damages.

3.

Trial Court's failure to award punitive damages.

4.

Adequacy of Attorney fees awarded to Seller.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
PHASE I. The Perkins,

the real property owners (Sellers),

brought suit against the purchaser of the real property, Coombs
Investment Corporation, referred to as CIC (Buyer) and the
purchase money lender, Interlake Thrift (Lender), to determine
the priority of liens on the real property when the Buyer
defaulted and failed to make his payments to the Lender.

In

the course of the purchase the Buyer had given to the Seller a
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second Trust Deed to secure a Promissory Note for the balance
of the purchase price,

PHASE II,

In the refinancing of the delinquent loan for

the Buyer, the Lender required a subordination by the Seller of
his retained interest in the property.

Lender failed to

disclose some of the terms of the refinanced loan for which
Trial Court awarded damages and attorney fees in behalf of
Seller.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On July 26, 1982, the Sellers filed a Complaint in

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
against Dick E. Coombs (Coombs), Coombs Investment Corporation
(Buyer) and Interlake Thrift (Lender).

Coombs and CIC filed a

Third-party Complaint against Century 21 Monson and Company,
Peter R. Lucero and Jessie Monson.

Interlake Thrift

cross-claimed against Coombs and brought a Third-party
Complaint against Guaranty Title Company, Southern Title
Guaranty Company, Mark Williams and Ruth R. Coombs.

The

Third-party actions Monson and Company, Lucero and Monson were
subsequently dismissed pursuant to motion and stipulation.
Interlake's claim against Williams was dismissed after Phase I
at the trial. Actions by and against Coombs and Ruth Coombs
were stayed by the bankruptcy filings during the course of the
actions.
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C.

DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT.
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake

County, bifurcated the trial on this matter due to the
multiplicity of issues that centered around two separate
transactions; the initial sale of the real property in question
on October 31, 1980 and the refinancing of the Buyer's loan
with the Lender on November 27, 1981.

The two trials were

heard without a jury.

PHASE I.

The Trial Court dealt with ^:he issues of priority

between the Seller who owned the real property, the Buyer and
the Lender.

Lender was found to have priority in the sale of

October 31, 1980, over the Seller.

All parties received a

judgment against Buyer, but no judgments were taken against
Coombs and Ruth R. Coombs due to the Automatic Stay of their
personal bankruptcy filings.

PHASE II.

The Trial Court dealt with the issues

surrounding the refinancing of the original loan by Buyer and a
personal loan of Coombs with Lender that resulted from Buyer's
default on the original loan of October 31, 1980.

In the

refinancing of the original Promissory Note and Trust Deed of
October 31, 1980, Lender required that the Sellers subordinate
their second position Trust Deed to that of Lender.

The Trial

Court found that in obtaining the Subordination Agreement from
the Sellers, Lender had failed to disclose certain relevant
facts and Lender's actions constituted fraud and award actual
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damages in favor of the Sellers in the amount of $2,464.41
together with

attorney's fees in the sum of $2,500.00 for a

total judgment of $5,136.87. Lender paid Sellers the judgment
amount on April 6, 1984, and a Satisfaction of Judgment,
reserving the right of Seller to appeal, was granted Lender on
December 1, 1984, by the Trial Court. (R.,p. 905-907)

Costs

granted to the Sellers in Phase II were disallowed by the Trial
Court in a proceeding on December 26, 1984. (R. , p.892-894)
Numerous post trial motions to amend and for a new trial were
brought by the Sellers which were denied.

Sellers brought this

action appealing certain issues in Phase I and Phase II as were
found by the Trial Court.

STATEMENT OF FACT.

The statement of facts will follow the segmented format
as to Phase I and Phase II.

A.

PHASE I.
1.

George S. Perkins and Lillie Perkins, husband and

wife, (Sellers) were the owners and occupiers of a residence
located at 54 South Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

In June of 1980, they determined to

sell their residence and listed the property at 54 South Jeremy
Street, with Peter R. Lucero, a real estate agent of Century-21
Monson and Company.
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2.

On September 17, 1980, Paul S^ott, a real estate

agent for Coombs Investment Corporation, (Buyer) met with the
Sellers in their home with Sellers1 realtor, Lucero. Scott
presented them with an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase. (R., p.213-214) (Ex., 1-P)

The Earnest Money Receipt

and Offer to Purchase was signed by Sellers on September 22,
1980, along with a Counter Offer of the same date. (Ex., 15-D)
While in the home, Scott made a presentation outlining the
terms and conditions of the Earnest Money to both Sellers and
Lucero, their Realtor.
3.

At the same meeting on September 17, 1980, Scott

spelled out in detail the subordination of Sellers to a
purchase money lender that was to be chosen by Buyer to fund
the purchase from Sellers.

(R., p.1246, 1.10-25).

The Earnest

Money of September 17, 1980, provided on Line 51 (Ex., 1-P)
that the Sellers would Deed their interest in the home to
Buyer.

Buyer would then convey a second Trust Deed to Seller

after conveying a first Trust Deed to a Lender.

The Earnest

Money also provided that Buyer could substitute collateral for
the second Trust Deed to Sellers with other collateral than the
54 South Jeremy property.

That Seller signed the Earnest Money

Agreement and an attached Counter Offer on September 22, 1980,
are facts not in dispute.

The Earnest Money and the Counter

Offer of September 22, 1980, were both accepted by Buyer on
September 23, 1980, again a nondisputed fact.
4.

In early October 1980, Coombs, President of Buyer,

contacted Lender's Manager, Ronald D. Adams, with the purpose
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of taking out a loan with Lender.
p.12,17)

(Depo. of Adams 11-12-82;

Coombs represented to Adams that Buyer wished to buy

the property at 54 South Jeremy Street with funds provided by
Lender.

(R.,p.1027)

Adams informed Coombs that before Lender

could loan money to Buyer the 54 South Jeremy Street property
would have to be vested in the name of the Buyer, and that
Lender would have to be placed in a first position in the
property before Lender could make the loan to Buyer. (R.,p.1033
1.25; p.1034 1.1,25)
5.

During the entire period of negotiations between

Buyer and Lender, no contact was made between Lender and
Seller. (R.,p.1028, 1.4 - 6; p.1033, 1.10 - 12)

Lender was

not aware of the circumstances or terms of the purchase between
Buyer and Seller nor the fact that Buyer intended to grant
Seller a second Trust Deed as security for the balance of the
purchase price.
6.

(R.,p.1034, 1.16-23; R.,p.1036, 1.16-24)

On October 29, 1980, Buyer executed a Promissory

Note and Trust Deed to Lender in the amount of $20,756.44.

The

Trust Deeds secured a first interest in the property at 54
South Jeremy Street. (Ex., 5-P and 6-P)

On the same date,

Lender prepared Escrow Instructions to Guaranty Title Company
for closing the transaction between Buyer and Seller.

The

instructions required the Title Company to place Lender in a
first position before disbursement of funds could be made.
document was acknowledged by Buyer f s President, Coombs.
2-P)
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The

(Ex.,

7.

On October 31, 1980, the closing of the transaction

between Buyer and Seller took place at Guaranty Title Company
in Salt Lake City.

Those in attendance were Seller (both Mr.

and Mrs. Perkins) their realtor, Lucero, Coombs as President of
Buyer, Scott, Buyer's Realtor, and the closing officer, Mark J.
Williams.
closing.

No representative from Lender was present at the
(R.,p.1079, 1008, 1081)

8.

During the closing on October 31, 1980, the closing

officer spent approximately an hour goincj through the documents
and explaining the transaction to the parties present,
including Seller and their realtor, Lucero.

Specifically, the

closing officer informed Seller that they would receive a
second position Trust Deed in regard to their property and that
Lender would be in a first and prior position on the property,
Neither Seller nor his Realtor asked any questions or made any
objections as to the information on documents presented.
Seller executed the documents in the presence of all the
parties at closing. (R.p.1084, 1.20-25; jf.1085, 1.1-20;
R.,p.1093, 1.7-23; R.,p.1101, 1.11-17, 20-25; p.1102, 1.1-8;
p.1230, 1.19-25)
9.

At the conclusion of the closing of October 31,

1980, the executing parties, Seller signed an unrestricted
Warranty Deed and Buyer a second position Trust Deed and
Promissory Note.

The closing officer disbursed the funds in

accordance with the terms and conditions of the Escrow Letter
of October 29, 1980, by Lender.

On the same day, October 31,

1980, the documents were recorded in order of priority pursuant
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to the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement and the Escrow
Instructions of the Lender.

Seller unrestricted Warranty Deed

to Buyer was recorded first as Entry No. 3497140, Book 5172,
Page 719.

The Trust Deed from Buyer to Lender was recorded

next as Entry No. 3497141, Book 5172, Page 720, placing Lender
in a first position to the Warranty Deed from Seller to Buyer,
pursuant to the Escrow Instructions and Earnest Money
Agreement.

The Trust Deed from Buyer to Seller was recorded as

Entry No. 3497142, Book 5172, Page 722, in a second position
behind Lender, again in accordance with the Earnest Money
Agreement of September 17, 1980, and the Escrow Instructions of
October 29, 1980.
10.

(Ex., 1-P, 2-P)

Subsequently, on October 31, 1980, Guaranty Title

Company prepared and furnished Lender a Policy of Title
Insurance through its underwriter, Southern Title Guaranty
Company, in the amount of $20,756.44 the amount of the Trust
Deed from Buyer to Lender.

(Ex., 12-P)

The Title Policy

showed the property vested in Buyer with Lender holding a first
Trust Deed on the property.

The Policy did not show any

interest by Seller, nor was there any communication to Lender
of Seller's interest.
11.

At the closing of October 31, 1980, Seller received

from the proceeds of the transaction (loaned by Lender to
Buyer) $10,301.25 as was set out by the Seller's Settlement
Statement. (Ex., 9-P) (R.,p.1294, 1.9-13)
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B. PHASE II.
All facts under Phase II occurred subsequent to October
31, 1980, and relate to issues as were litigated in Phase II of
the Trial.
12.

During the year 1981, Buyer became delinquent upon

the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed
of October 29, 1980.

Lender gave Buyer three alternatives to

resolve the default, (1) to bring the Promissory Note current;
(2) refinance the loan with Lender; or (3) Lender could
foreclose its Trust Deed.

Buyer elected to rewrite the loan.

Coombs, the President of Buyer also had a delinquent personal
loan with Lender which he requested Lender to consolidate in
the refinancing of the Promissory Note of October 31, 1980, to
reduce the combined monthly payments.

Coombs also requested

that the term of the Note be shortened. (R., p.1386, 1387)
13.

Upon examination of the title of 57 South Jeremy

Street, Lender became aware for the first time of Sellers
second position Trust Deed.

(R., p.1377, 1.4-6; p.1431, 1.2-5)

As a condition of refinancing the Trust Deed and Promissory
Note of October 29, 1980, Lender required Buyer to obtain a
Subordination Agreement from the Seller in order to preserve
the prior position that Lender had obtained in the original
closing on October 31, 1980. (R.,p.1392, 1.4-23)

The

Subordination Agreement was given to Buyer to present to the
Seller and have executed as a condition of completing the loan.
(Ex. 40-D) (R.,p.1354, 1.9-16)
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14.

On November 27, 1981, subject to an executed and

recorded Subordination Agreement, Buyer refinanced the
Promissory Note of October 29, 1980, paying off the balance of
that Note in the amount of $22,093.89 and paying off the
remaining balance of Coomb's personal loan with Lender in the
amount of $2,464.41. The total of the new Promissory Note of
November 27, 1981, was the sum of $24,558.30 (R.,p.1398,
1.14-25; p.1399, 1.1-3).

A Declaration of Business Purpose

was executed by Buyer on November 27, 1981, stating the new
loan was a "commercial loan".
15.

(Ex. 51-P)

The Promissory Note and Trust Deed of November 27,

1981, while executed by Buyer was still contingent upon receipt
and recording of the executed Subordination Agreement of
November 27, 1981. The Subordination Agreement was given to
Buyer to have it executed by Seller.

Seller refused to sign

the Subordination Agreement for Buyer.
16.

During the month of December 1981, Lenderfs Officer

talked with Seller for the first time and subsequently with
their attorney, Robert Knight, who had been retained to advise
the Seller on the execution of the Subordination Agreement.
17.

On December 30, 1981, Lender's Officer talked with

Knight on the telephone and subsequently wrote a letter to him
indicating that the Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, would
be larger than the old loan in addition to the interest and
costs.

(Ex., 41-D)

Lender's Officer did not inform Sellers or

their attorney that that Promissory Note of November 27, 1981,
included the consolidation of a personal note of Coombs for
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$2,464.41 which was now included in the ainount of the
Promissory Note of November 27, 1981 which totaled $24,688.70.
However, Seller and their attorney were furnished the total
amount of the consolidated loan of $24,688.70 which was stated
on the face of the Subordination Agreement which Sellers and
their attorney reviewed prior to execution of the Subordination
Agreement.
18.

(Ex., 40-D)
On December 30, 1981, Sellers, in the presence of

their attorney, Knight, executed the Subordination Agreement of
November 27, 1981, which contained the amount of the new
Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, in the amount of
$24,688.70.

Knight, their attorney, notarized the

Subordination Agreement and had in his presence at the time of
the notarization, Lender's letter of December 30, 1980.
p.1430, 1.4-6; p.1445, 1.1-25)

(R.,

Sellers and their attorney were

informed by Lender that if Sellers did not sign the
Subordination Agreement, Lender would hav£ no alternative but
to foreclose on the property. (R.,p.1431, 1.6-19, 25)
19.

The executed Subordination Agreement was

subsequently returned to Lender who had it recorded on January
6, 1982, as Entry No. 3637295, Book 5329, Page 6.

The Trust

Deed of November 27, 1981, was recorded as Entry No. 3637296,
Book 5329, Page 7.

The Promissory Note and Trust Deed of

October 29, 1980, were paid off from the (proceeds of the
November 27, 1981, loan as was Coombs personal loan. (Ex.,
34-D, 35-D, 33-D)
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20.

By May of 1982, Buyer defaulted on its Promissory

Note to Lender, and a Notice of Default was recorded on June
10, 1982. A Notice of Sale was recorded on October 29, 1982.
The sale of the property was held on December 7, 1982, and was
sold by Lender with the Lender being the only bidder at the
sale.

Lender purchased the property with a bid of $36,068.73,

the amount then due and owing on the Promissory Note of
November 27, 1981, together with the costs and expenses of
sale.
21.

Lender listed the real property at 54 South Jeremy

Street for re-sale on January 8, 1983. (R.,p.1482, 1.9-11)
(Ex.,58-D)

The property was subsequently sold on September 15,

1983, to a third party for the sum of $28,700.00 at 12%
interest, with Lender providing the financing.

(Ex., 57-D)

(R.,p.1494, 1.6-22)
22.

During the course of the foreclosure and resale of

the property, Lender suffered a loss on the real property of at
least $7,368.73.

(R.,p.1417, 1.12-25; p.1418, 1.1-25)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A. PHASE I.
Point 1. Priority of Title;

The priority of title in

this case is controlled by Kemp vs. Zions First National Bank,
Utah 470 P.2d 390 (1970).

The Trial Court correctly found that
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the elements contained in Kemp were found in the case at hand
as follows:
(a)

Unrestricted Warranty Deed,

Seller

executed at the closing an unrestricted Warranty Deed
that followed the intent of the Earnest Money Agreement
to subordinate the Seller's interest to that of the
Lender.
(b)

Reliance by Lender,

The Lender's total

involvement in the transaction beginning with the
negotiation with the Buyer and th^ Escrow Instructions
to the Title Company, showed that the loan would not
have been made without the Lender being placed in a
first position on the property.
(c)

Lack of Knowledge by Lender.

Lender had

no constructive or actual knowledge of Seller's
retained interest.
Seller.

Lender had no contact with the

The Buyer failed to inform the Lender of any

retained interest as did the Title Company.
(d)

Priority of Recording.

The actual

recordation of the conveyances followed the intent of
the parties, the documents comprising the written
agreements between the parties and the sales
presentations.
(e)

Accepted Proceeds.

The Seller accepted

the proceeds of the sale without disclosing his
retained interest to Lender.
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Point 2.

Subordination by Seller,

The entire

transaction from the sales presentation, the Earnest Money
Agreement, the Escrow Instructions to the Title Company, the
presentation of the closing officer, through the recordation of
the documents clearly show that it was the intent of all
parties that the Seller subordinate his interest to the Lender.
Point 3.

No Constructive Notice to the Lender,

The

only notice Lender had of Seller was a Preliminary Title Report
showing the property vested in the Seller's name.

Lender acted

on this knowledge by requiring a subordination of Seller's
position and there was no basis in fact for Lender's
constructive notice of Seller's retained interest.
Point 4.

Duty of Seller to Inquiry.

Seller had a

responsibility to ensure that its contract with the Buyer was
performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of that
Contract.

Seller cannot shift the responsibility to enforce

that Agreement to the Lender who had no knowledge of the
Agreement or its terms.
Point 5.

The Merger Doctrine Applies.

Lender pleaded

the Merger Doctrine in its Amended Answer to Plaintiff's
Unified Complaint.

Merger is presumed and Sell€>r failed to

rebutt the presumption.

B. PHASE II.
Point 1.

Rescission is Not an Appropriate Remedy.

Rescission of the Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981,
would have placed the Seller in such a position as to be unable
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to receive any monetary damages.

Sellei: would have been

subject to the foreclosure of the Trust Deed of October 29,
1980, and not entitled to a monetary damage award by virtue of
his claimed election of remedies..
Point 2. Mitigation of Damages.

try to mitigate

Seller had a duty to

his damages at the foreclosure

of the

Trust

Deed of November 27, 1981, and failed to do so. The
consolidation of a personal loan with the commercial loan
resulting in the increase of the amount of the loan by
$2,465.41 did not relieve the Seller of his duty to mitigate.
Point 3.

Punitive Damages Not Warranted.

of the Lender was not willful nor malicious.

The conduct

The facts and

circumstances and amount of damages were not sufficient to
support punitive damages.

The loan of November 27, 1981, was

in compliance with Utah Consumer Credit Code.

The Lender made

no profit by his misconduct.
Point 4. Award of Attorney's Fees was Reasonable.
The Trial Court in its discretion correctly reduced Seller's
attorney's fees due to duplicative and ^warranted legal
proceedings instigated by Seller.
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A R G U M E N T

A, PHASE I ,

POINT 1,

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT LENDER
MAINTAINED ITS PRIOR POSITION IN THE REAL
PROPERTY SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Under the facts of this case, priority of title is
controlled by Kemp vs. Zions First National Bank, Utah 470 P.
2d 390 (1970).

The elements necessary for establishing a

preference to a Lender who loans money for a purchase money
mortgage on real property are set out in Kemp, supra, on Page
393:
"We have been shown no authority which
approves giving preference to a purchase
money mortgagee under facts as found by
the Trial Court set forth above; where
such claimants have been given an
unrestricted Warranty Deed, knowing that
the financing bank was going to rely on
it; where the bank had neither actual or
constructive knowledge that the vendor
retained an interest in the property,
and the latter, who had failed to record
their own mortgage, in full knowledge of
facts, went to the bank and in effect
approved the transaction by accepting
their share of the proceeds therefrom,
but without disclosing that they retained
an interest"
[emphasis added]
The Trial Court in applying the criteria set out above
correctly found that the instant case closely followed the
facts of Kemp, supra, and found the Lender had preference over
the Seller who sold his property to the Buyer on October 31,
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1980.

The elements of Kemp, supra, as applied to the facts of

the instant case are as follows:
(a)

Unrestricted Warranty Deed;

Seller

knowingly and intentionally subordinated their priority
in the property by virtue of the terms and the
conditions of the Earnest Money Agreement of September
17, 1980, (Ex., 1-P). That Agreement at Line 51, set
out with particularity that the Seller would
subordinate its interest to a Lender of the Buyer's
choice.

Furthermore, the Seller at the closing of the

transaction at the Title Company on October 31, 1980,
was explained the terms and the conditions of the
transaction by the closing officer, Williams, who
explained in detail the transaction and the
subordination of the Sellerfs interest to the Lender.
(R.,p.1084, 1.20-25; p.1085, 1.11-20; R.,p.1093,
1.17-23; R.,p.1101, 1.11-17, 1.20-25; R.,p.1102, 1.1-8;
R.,p.1230, 1.19-25)

Additionally, the Seller had

opportunity to examine the Lender's Escrow
Instructions, received explanations by the Closing
Officer, reviewed the unrestricted Warranty Deed and
executed the same knowing that it would be recorded.
(b)

Reliance by Lender.

The Lender's

involvement in the transaction and willingness to make
the loan was conditioned upon it being placed in a
first position in the title to the real property.

This

was clearly stated by the Lender's Officer many times
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during the course of the transaction.
1.25; R.,p.1034, 1.1,25)

(R.,p.1035,

The Lender provided Escrow

Instructions to the Title Company who acted as a
fiduciary to close the transaction for both parties,
which instructed that the monies accompanying the
Escrow Letter were not to be disbursed unless the
Lender was placed in a first position.
(c)

(Ex., 2-P)

Lack of Knowledge by Lender.

The Lender

had no knowledge of Seller's retained interest in the
closing of the parties on October 31, 1980.
had never met the Seller.
1.10-12)

The Lender

(R.,p.1028, 1.4-6; p.1033,

Lender was not aware of the circumstances of

the purchase nor of the retained interest by the
Seller. (R., p.1034, 1.16-23; R.,p.1036, 1.16-24)
The Seller never disclosed to the Lender that they had
retained an interest in the real property.

Neither the

closing officer of the Title Company disclosed to
Lender that Seller had maintained an interest in the
property, nor did the Title Policy of Insurance, which
was issued subsequently by the Title Company, disclose
any subsequent or retained interest in the property by
the Seller.
(d)

(Ex., 12-P)
Priority of Recording.

The recording of

the various Conveyances was in accordance with the
facts and circumstances that existed during the entire
course of the transaction between the Seller, Buyer and
Lender.

The priority of the recording followed the
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representations made in the sales presentation of the
Buyer to the Seller on September 17, 1980, where Scott,
Buyer's Realtor presented the Earnest Money Agreement
to Sellers. (R.,p.1246, 1.10-25)

The Earnest Money

Agreement of September 17, 1980, also contained a
subordination clause which would give the Lender
priority.

(Ex., 1-P)

The Lender's Escrow Instructions

to the Title Company also provided that the Lender's
interest would have a priority, (fex., 2-P)

The

exclamation of the closing officer at the closing to
the Seller and the Buyer also followed the same
intended sequence, (please see referenced citations
stated above)

The documents themselves were recorded

in the proper sequence as their entry numbers so
disclose. (Ex.,4-P, 5-P, 7-P)
(e) Accepted Proceeds.

Seller accepted and

took the proceeds of the sale furnished by the Lender
and did not disclose to Lender its retained interest in
the property. (Ex., 9-P) (R.,p.1294, 1.9-13)

Point 2.

SELLER INTENTIONALLY SUBORDINATED ITS
PRIORITY TO THE LENDER IN THE TITLE TO
THE REAL PROPERTY.

The Trial Court correctly found that the Seller had
subordinated its priority in the title to the real property to
that of the Lender.

That subordination to the Lender was a

constant and ever present condition in the entire sales
transaction from the beginning to the end as is more

-20-

particularly set out above in Point 1.

While certain

variations existed from the terms of the Earnest Money
Agreement of September 17, 1980 to the Promissory Note of
October 29, 1980, between the Lender and the Buyer in the
amount of the loan, the rate of interest and the term of
repayment; there was no vagueness in regard that were would be
a subordination of the Seller's interest to that of the Lender.
(Ex., 1-P, 6-P)

Seller's failure to inquire as to the terms

of the loan and the execution of the unrestricted Warranty Deed
constituted a waiver and estoppel to any subsequent objection
to the ultimate terms of that Promissory Note as were negotiated between the Buyer and the Lender.

The terms of the

Earnest Money Agreement were merged into the unrestricted
Warranty Deed.

Any discrepancy between the Earnest Money

Agreement and the final Promissory Note between the Lender and
the Buyer dealt with terms of and performance of the agreement
between the Seller and the Buyer.

The responsibility to ensure

performance with that agreement was the Seller's, not the
Lender as is suggested by Seller's argument on appeal.
The Seller cites several cases in support of its
position.

Miller vs. Citizens Savings and Loan Association,

Ct. App., 56 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1967), under facts that are
substantially different from the case before the Court, holds
that rights of priority under an Agreement of Subordination
extend to and are limited strictly by the express terms and
conditions of the Agreement.

However, in the instant case the

terms of the Earnest Money Agreement are vague and broad.
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The

only point that is not vague or broad, is that the Lender shall
have priority, which in the instant case bccurred at the
recording of the unrestricted

Warranty Deed.

The case of Troj vs. Chesebro, (Conn.) 296 A2d 685,
(1972) had facts substantially different from the instant case
as well, in that the subordination provisions were entirely
silent, thus creating a statute of frauds problem.
the case here.

That is not

The Subordination Agreement was not silent and

that while the terms were vague and broad and left latitude in
the final incorporation of those terms, they clearly avoid a
statute of frauds problem.

These cases should not be

controlling.

POINT 3.

THE LENDER RECEIVED NO ACTUAL OR
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF SELLER'S
RETAINED INTEREST.

The Lender had no actual or constructive notice of the
retained interest by the Seller in the real property.

Lender's

Preliminary Title Report (Ex., 11-P) showed the property vested
in the Seller.

The Lender responded to this knowledge by

informing the Buyer that any loan would be conditional upon the
Buyer being the vested owner and the Lender being placed in a
first position in the title to the property.
1. above for citations)

(Please see Point

Under the Escrow Instructions, the

closing at the Title Company, the sequence of the recording of
the documents, and the Policy of Title Insurance all confirm
that priority as was required by the Lender.
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As is more fully

set out in Point 1. above, no information was given to the
Lender as to the subsequent retained interest by the Seller in
the property by any of the parties or fiduciaries involved.
The Lender's notice of the vested interest in the Seller at the
beginning of the transaction had been resolved to the
satisfaction of the Lender to protect his position.

There was

nothing to alert the Lender of any subsequent retained interset
in the property by the Seller.

POINT 4.

SELLER HAD A DUTY TO INQUIRE AS TO
THE TERMS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE
OF OCTOBER 29, 1980.

The Seller and the Buyer had contracted independently
to buy and sell real property by virtue of their Earnest Money
Agreement of September 17, 1980.

As contracting parties they

had the responsibility of ensuring that the terms of the
Earnest Money Agreement were followed.

Nothing in the terms of

the Earnest Money Agreement of September 17, 1980, required
that any other party or entity assumed that enforcement
responsibility.

Seller cannot shift the responsibility to

enforce the Earnest Money Agreement to the Lender, who had no
contract or contact with the Seller, no knowledge of the
Earnest Money Agreement, who escrowed the funds with the Title
Company, did not attend the closing, and never became aware of
the Seller's retained interest in the property, either before
or after the transaction was completed.
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The Seller would urge the Court to believe it was the
Lender who created the loss and, therefore, should suffer the
loss rather than the Seller.

As authority for that proposition

it sites Hansen vs. Beehive Security Company,
66 (1963) .

Utah, 380 P.2d

That case sets out the proposition that a loss

should fall on him who created circumstances from which the
loss resulted where one of two innocent parties must suffer a
loss.

Assuming, as the facts show, that the loss was created

by the default of the Buyer in making the payments on the
Promissory Note to the Lender, it was not the Lender who
created the circumstances from which the loss resulted.

It was

the Seller who had contracted with the Buyer in September of
19 80, and agreed to the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement
and had completed the transaction.
created the circumstances.

It was the Seller who

Based upon the holding of the

referenced case above, it is the Seller yho must suffer the
loss.

POINT 5.

THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT AND THE
UNRESTRICTED WARRANTY DEED WERE SUBJECT
TO MERGER.

The Trial Court was correct in determining that the
Merger Doctrine applied to the Earnest Money Agreement of
September 17, 1980, and the unrestricted Warranty Deed of
October 31, 1980 from the Seller to the Buyer and the resultant
Trust Deed and Promissory Note to the Lender from the Buyer.
The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement of September 17, 1980,
were vague and ambiguous as to the amounts, rate of interest
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and term of repayment that the Buyer could undertake with the
Lender. While there were differences between the Earnest Money
Agreement and the Promissory Note of October 29, 1980, those
differences were not material or substantial enough to prohibit
the merger of the Earnest Money Agreement into the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed.
A presumption of merger is established where parties
finalize the transaction with documents that differ from the
initial documents.

Sellers failed to rebutt this presumption

by their total lack of inquiry or attempt of enforcement of
those terms at the closing at the Title Company on October 31,
1980.

Neither the Seller nor their realtor made any inquiry

as to the terms and conditions of the Buyer and Lender's
Promissory Note.
The general doctrine of merger in the State of Utah has
been established by a series of cases which established the
doctrine that when a deed executes a contract for the sale of
land, all provisions of any prior contract are merged into the
deed.

If a party subsequently denies merger due to a mistake,

that party has the party to show mistake by clear and
convincing evidence.

Neeley vs. Kelsch, Utah 600 P.2d 979

(1979); Rasmussen vs. Olton, Utah, 583 P.2d 50 (1978); Espinoza
vs. Safeco Title Insurance Company, Utah, 598 P.2d 346 (1979);
and Baxter vs. Stubbs, Utah, 620 P.2d 69 (1980)
The Trial Court correctly found that the presumption of
merger had not been rebutted by the Seller with clear and
convincing evidence.

The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement
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of September 17, 1980, were vague and quite broad and failed to
contain any information as to the term of repayment payment,
and while the resulting Deeds and Promissory Notes finalizing
the parties agreement, varied from the teitms of the Earnest
Money Agreement, the differences were not substantial enough to
deny a merger.
Contrary to the assertion of the Seller, Lender pled
the merger.

Lender pled the Merger Doctirine in its Amended

Answer to Plaintiff's Unified Amended Complaint as its Fifth
Affirmative Defense, filed with the Trial Court on September
26, 1983. (R., p.496)

B. PHASE II

POINT 1.

RESCISSION WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
FOR THE SELLER AS AN ELECTION OF DAMAGES.

The Trial Court correctly determined that rescission
was not an appropriate remedy for Seller.

The voiding or

rescission of the Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981,
by the Court as urged by the Seller, would not have placed the
Seller in a first position in the real property as asserted by
the Seller on appeal.

The Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, was

to be released only upon the condition precedent that the
Lender remain in its first priority position when it undertook
to refinance and pay off the Trust Deed of October 29, 1980.
The refinancing and rewriting of the Trust Deed of October 29,
1980, with the new Trust Deed of November 27, 1981, was
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conditional upon the Seller signing a Subordination Agreement
and its recordation.
Without the Subordination Agreement of November 27,
1981, no refinancing would have been accomplished and hence the
Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, would not have been paid off or
released.

The priority of the Lender would have remained in

the same position as it was during the course of the Trust Deed
of October 29, 1980, that is, maintaining a first priority
position in the title to the property.

The Seller would have

maintained its second Trust Deed position. (R., p.1352, 1.4-23)
Thus, had the Trial Court rescinded the Trust Deed of November
27, 1981, due to the Lender's misconduct in obtaining the
Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981, the Seller would
have been subject to foreclosure of the delinquent Promissory
Note and Trust Deed of October 29, 1980.

The Trial Court by

assessing actual monetary damages suffered by the Seller was
more beneficial to the Seller than had the Court rescinded the
Promissory Note and Trust Deed of November 27, 1981.

POINT 2.

SELLER HAD A DUTY TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES
IN THE FORECLOSURE OF THE TRUST DEED OF
NOVEMBER 27, 1981.

The Trial Court correctly held that it is generally
accepted law in the State of Utah that the Seller had a
responsibility to mitigate his damages by curing the default of
the Buyer in his Trust Deed with the Seller, and that the
Seller failed to do so.

This principle of law is supported by

a body of cases in the State of Utah.
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Utah Farm Production

Credit Association vs. Cox, Utah, 627 P.2d 62 (1981); Thompson
vs. Jacobsen, Utah, 463 P.2d 801 (1970)
The Seller on appeal would urge this Court that it was
the misconduct of the Lender that prohibited the Seller from
mitigating his damages.

The misconduct of the Seller in

failing to disclose all the terms of the Subordination
Agreement of November 27, 1981, made no appreciable difference
in the damages to the Seller.

Had Sellerf not executed the

Subordination Agreement of November 27, 1981, Lender would have
foreclosed the Trust Deed of October 29, 1980. The amount to
cure the default under the Trust Deed of November 27, 1981, was
$24,688.70 as opposed to the balance of $22,224.29 to cure the
default of the Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, a difference of
$2,464.41.

(R.,p.1398, 1.14-25; p.1399, 1.1-3)

The Seller

would have had the duty to mitigate his damages under either
Trust Deed foreclosure.

There was no showing by the Seller

that the difference of $2,464.41 restricted the Seller from
mitigating his damages under the foreclo$ure of the Trust Deed
of November 27, 1981.

POINT 3.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT WARRANTED TO
SELLER.

The Trial Court correctly held not to award punitive
damages against the Lender in behalf of the Seller.

Punitive

damages constitute an extraordinary remedy outside the granting
of normal damages incurred by the damaged party.

Punitive

damages go beyond the mere violation of the rights of the
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Seller which occurred here.

For punitive damages to be

correctly awarded, conduct of the Lender would have had to be
found to be "willful and malicious."

First Security Bank of

Utah vs. J.B.J. Feedyards, Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982)
The conduct of the Lender was not willful nor
malicious.

The Lender failed to disclose to the Seller only

that the Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, included a
personal loan of the President of the Buyer.

The Lender fully

disclosed to the Seller the entire amount of the new combined
Promissory Note.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the

transaction do not warrant nor support punitive damages.
Seller would urge this Court that the refinancing of
the Promissory Note of October 29, 1980, and the Consumer Loan
of Coombs, violated the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The
statutes do not support that view.

§70B-3-206 U.C.A. (1953, as

amended) deals with loan finance charges and setting certain
limits of those finance charges (the statute has since been
repealed, but was in effect at the time of the transaction in
question) in the consolidation of a "consumer loan" with
another "consumer loan" or a "consumer credit sale". This
statute does not deal with the question of a consolidation of a
"commercial loan"

as the UCCC places "Commercial Loans"

outside the purview of the statute.
A review of the facts clearly shows that it was the
intent of the parties that the loan be a "commercial loan", and
a Declaration of Business Purpose was executed by the Buyer on
November 27, 1981.

(Ex., 51-P)

The proceeds from the new loan
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completely paid off and satisfied the "commercial loan" of
October 29, 1980, and Coomb's personal consumer loan.
pl398, 1.14-25; p.1399, 1.1-3)

(R.,

A totally new and separate

loan was consummated at the same time by virtue of the
Promissory Note of November 27, 1981, secpred by a Trust Deed
on the property in question.

The Utah Uniform Consumer Credit

Code clearly places no limit on the finanpe charge of that
transaction as it was a "commercial loan"!.
"70B-3-605. FINANCE CHARGE FOR OTHER LOANS.
With respect to a loan other than a consumer
loan the parties may contract for the payment
by the Debtor of (any) finance charge."
[emphasis added]
The Seller would also urge the Court that the Lender
made a significant profit and thus shoulq be subject to
punitive damages.
record.

That assertion is not supported by the

The Lender sold the property forf $7,368.73 less than

it bid for the property at its own Trustee's sale and had to
finance the long term financing at 12% iriterest for the new
Buyer, which was substantially less than the rate with the
original Buyer.

(Ex., 57-D) R.,pl494, 1,16-22; p.1417,

1.12-25; p.1418, 1.1-25)

POINT 4.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED TO THE SELLER
WERE REASONABLE

The Trial Court correctly reduced the attorney's fees
requested by the Seller to the sum of $21500.00.

The Trial

Court in assessing the attorney's fees indicated it had
reviewed the file in detail and, in fact, had heard the case
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from its inception.

The Trial Court stated that the pleadings

and the record clearly supported a reduction of attorney's fee
claimed.

A review of the Index of the pleadings clearly reveal

the Seller's unwarranted and unnecessary judicial proceedings
with duplicate depositions, numerous pre-trial and post-trial
hearings and motions brought by the Seller that were redundant
and unnecessary.

(R., p.976, 1.1-11)

CONCLUSION
A. PHASE I.
Lender would urge that the Trial Court's ruling as to
Phase I be affirmed and maintained as this case clearly fits
within the parameters set out in Kemp vs. Zions First National
Bank, supra,.

The case at hand is even stronger as the Seller

in its Earnest Money Agreement clearly subordinated his
priority in the title of the real property to that of the
Lender.

The testimony of the witnesses present during the

entire transaction from the inception of the sales presentation
until the closing, confirm that conclusion.

The documents

involved in the transaction are unequivocal in assuming that
there would be a subordination, and those documents subject to
recordation followed that subordination sequence.

It was the

intent of the parties that the Seller subordinate his interest
to the Lender.

That was clearly found by the Trier of Fact and

it is urged that this Court affirm that prior decision.
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B. PHASE II.
While the Lender does not agree with the Trial Court's
finding that the Lender was guilty of misconduct in the
execution of the Subordination Agreement in the loan of
November 27, 1981, and the resulting granting of damages and
attorney's fees, the Lender has chosen not to appeal that
ruling.

The Lender would urge this Court to affirm the Trial

Court's determination as to damages and attorney's fees as they
are reasonable appropriate in view of th0 Trial Court's ruling,
and are supported by the facts and surrounding circumstances.
Lender would pray that the costs of this Appeal be
assessed against the Seller, as the judgment of the Trial Court
has been satisfied by the Lender and that there is no clear
basis in law for the Seller to prevail on his appeal.
DATED this 21st day of October, 1985.
HUNT AND RUDD

HOLLIS S. HUNT
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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ADDENDUM

57-8-2. Eeoord imparts notioe.—Every conveyance, or instrument in
writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, and every patent to lands
within this state duly executed and verified according to law, and every
judgment, order or decree of any court of record in this state, or a copy
thereof, required by law to be recorded in the office of the county recorder
shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart
notice to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers,
mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with
notice.

67*3. Effect of failure to record.—Every conveyance of real estate
hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as provided in this title,
shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for
a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof,
where his own conveyance shall befirstduly recorded.

70B-3-205. Loan finance charge on refinancing. With respect to a
consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation, the lender may by agreement
with the debtor refinance the unpaid balance and may contract for and
receive a loanfinancecharge based on the principal resulting from the refinancing at a rate not exceeding that permitted by the provisions on loan
finance charge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201) or the provisions on
loan finance charge for supervised loans (section 70B-8-508), whichever is
appropriate. For the purpose of determining the loan finance charge permitted, the principal resulting from the refinancing comprises the following:
(1) if the transaction was not precomputed, the total of the unpaid balance and the accrued charges on the date of the refinancing, or,
if the transaction was precomputed, the amount which the debtor
would have been required to pay upon prepayment pursuant to the
provisions on rebate upon prepayment (section 70B-3-210) on the
date of refinancing, except that for the purpose of computing this
amount no minimum charge (section 70B-3-210) shall be allowed;
and
(2) appropriate additional charges (section 70B-3-202), payment of
which is deferred.
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ADDENDUM

70B-3-206. Loan finance charge on consolidation*
(1) If a debtor owes an unpaid balance to a lender with respect to a
consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation, and becomes obligated
on another consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation with the
same lender, the parties may agree to a consolidation resulting in
a single schedule of payments. If the previous consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation was not precomputed, the parties may
agree to add the unpaid amount of principal and accrued charges
on the date of consolidation to the principal with respect to the
subsequent loan. If the previous consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation was precomputed, the parties may agree to refinance the
unpaid balance pursuant to the provisions on refinancing (section
70B-3-205) and to consolidate the principal resulting from the refinancing by adding it to the principal with respect to the subsequent
loan. In either case the lender may contract for and receive a loan
finance charge based on the aggregate principal resulting from the
consolidation at a rate not in excess of that permitted by the provisions on loanfinancecharge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201)
or the provisions on loan finance charge for supervised loans
(section 70B-3-508), whichever is appropriate.
(2) The parties may agree to consolidate the unpaid balance of a consumer loan with the unpaid balance of a consumer credit sale. The
parties may agree to refinance the previous unpaid balance pursuant to the provisions on refinancing sales (section 70B-2-205) or
the provisions on refinancing loans (section 70B-8-205), whichever
is appropriate, and to consolidate the amount financed resulting
from the refinancing or the principal resulting from the refinancing
by adding it to the amount financed or principal with respect to
the subsequent sale or loan. The aggregate amount resulting from
the consolidation shall be deemed principal, and the creditor may
contract for and receive a loan finance charge based on the principal at a rate not in excess of that permitted by the provisions
on loan finance charge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201) or
the provisions on loanfinancecharge for supervised loans (section
70B-3-508), whichever is appropriate.
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